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Sincere Cooperation, Respect for Democracy, 
and EU Citizenship: Sufficient to Guarantee 
Scotland’s Future in the European Union? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Since the announcement of its independence referendum, the position of an 
independent Scotland within the European Union (EU) has been a subject of 
considerable debate and controversy. The European Commission has argued that any 
newly independent state formed from the territory of an existing Member State would 
be a new state for EU purposes. The process of acquiring membership of the EU 
would thus be the same as for any other state, concluding with an Accession Treaty. 
This article critiques that official position and distinguishes between a set of claims 
that could be made on behalf of an independent Scottish state, and a set of claims that 
could be made on behalf of the citizens of an independent Scottish state vis-à-vis the 
EU. It argues that the spirit and general principles of the EU Treaties ought to govern 
how an independent Scotland is treated and, given that claim, that a new Accession 
Treaty ought not be necessary. Furthermore, the expansionary rulings of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the area of EU citizenship, and the possibility of 
that Court being asked to rule on the claims of citizens of an independent Scotland, 
will cast a shadow over such a process. We conclude, however, that EU citizenship 
itself is not sufficient to guarantee or generate membership of the EU for an 
independent Scottish state. 
 
 
 
 
 
I  Introduction 
The issue of how, and whether, Scotland would retain its membership of the EU has 
become a source of considerable debate. The dominant argument conceptualises 
Scottish membership as entirely contingent on it being part of the territory of the UK.1 
The argument adopts a state-centric view of the EU and draws heavily on ideas and 
discourse from public international law. Others argue that Scotland’s membership 
would continue (effectively) automatically by virtue of the possession of EU 
citizenship by those currently holding UK citizenship and living in Scotland.2  In 
                                                        
1  The dominant argument is advanced by, amongst others, the European Commission (the 
Commission). 
2 A. O’Neill, ‘A Quarrel in a Faraway Country?: Scotland, Independence and the EU’, (4 Nov. 2011) 
EUtopia Law, at http://eutopialaw.com/2011/11/14/685 (all hyperlinks last checked on 30 June 2013). 
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contrast, such an argument adopts a citizen-centric view of the EU and draws on 
rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
The purpose of this article is to offer analysis of the various claims put forth for a 
scenario in which Scotland votes to become an independent state. While the article 
focuses on a specific example (in this case Scotland), many of the points are generally 
applicable. The issue is particularly salient given the broad swell in support for 
enhanced autonomy and/or independence from sub-state regions across the EU during 
2012. Giving serious political and legal thought to the issue the day after a ‘Yes’ vote 
in such a referendum is arguably too late. The groundwork ought to be laid now and it 
is in that spirit that this article is offered. 
The article first offers a critique of the official position set out by the 
Commission (Section II). It then separates the analysis into claims that could be made 
on behalf of a newly independent Scottish state (Section III), and claims that could be 
made on behalf of the citizens of a newly independent Scottish state (Section IV). This 
article argues that automatic expulsion of Scotland on the day of its independence 
stands at odds with the general principles and spirit of the EU Treaties. While 
negotiations would certainly be necessary3 – given that at a minimum the text of the 
Treaties would have to be amended – it is far-fetched to suggest that Scotland would 
at any point find itself on the outside seeking membership. It further argues that the 
Commission, in adopting its current official position, is failing to act in a manner 
consistent with the role it is charged with. The article goes on to argue that while the 
complex interplay of UK and EU law could result in the continuance of EU 
citizenship for many, even all, of those Scots who are UK citizens at the moment of 
independence, it is hard to envisage how the continuance of EU citizenship for those 
individuals could somehow be generative of EU membership for Scotland. A brief 
conclusion closes the article (Section V). 
It is worth noting that, though this article addresses a current issue in European 
Union Law, a number of the arguments offered could be applicable mutatis mutandis 
with respect to other future instances of prospective state secession, for example in 
Catalonia.4 In particular, the arguments in Sections II and III would, abstractly, apply  
                                                        
3 The issue of negotiations, which would undoubtedly be necessary, is not something that falls within 
the scope of this article. 
4 A different set of arguments would apply in instances where new states were formed by means other 
than secession, such as dissolution – as would likely be the case in any division of Belgium.  
 3 
generally to all secessions within the territory of the Union. The arguments made in 
Section IV are more specific to the Scottish question, owing to the uniqueness of 
British nationality law. The consequences for citizens of territories seceding from 
Member States  will, as Section IV argues, depend heavily on the law and practice of 
the nationality and citizenship law of the Member State concerned. 
It is also worth noting that the arguments made in this article based upon an 
amicable separation. The referendum in Scotland is taking place with the expressed 
authorisation of the UK Government, and Ministers have stated that the UK 
Government will ‘totally respect’ the outcome.5 In the absence of such authorisation 
from the government of the Member State concerned, the continuance, or otherwise, 
of the territory’s EU membership would be subject to altogether different 
considerations which fall outwith the scope of this article. 
 
 
II Challenging the Official Rhetoric 
The Commission has made two official statements on the issue. The first, by then 
Commission President, Romano Prodi, was delivered on 1 March 2004; the second, 
by his successor, José Manuel Barroso, was delivered on 10 December 2012.6 The 
statements are striking both for their consistency and simplicity. They are also, it is 
worth noting, more than mere throwaway remarks. The first is a response on behalf of 
the Commission to a question posed by a Member of the European Parliament; while 
the second is published correspondence between the President of the Commission and 
a member of a national legislature. This section will set out the Commission position 
and critique it. 
 
A The Commission’s position: Become Independent, Leave the EU 
                                                        
5 http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/top-stories/scottish-independence-
uk-will-respect-yes-vote-1-3306378 
6 R. Prodi, ‘Answer given by Mr. Prodi on behalf of the Commission’, 2004 O.J. C84 E/422, at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:084E:0422:0423:en:pdf; J.M. 
Barroso, ‘Scotland and the EU: Barroso’s reply to Lord Tugendhat’, (10 Dec. 2012) House of Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee, at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/economic-
affairs/ScottishIndependence/EA55_Letter_to_EU_President_20121029.pdf. 
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The first official response from the Commission set out a clear position on the issue 
and bears quoting at some length. Prodi stated that 
 
The treaties apply to the Member States (Article 299 of the EC Treaty7). When a part of the 
territory of a Member State ceases to be a part of the state, e.g. because that territory becomes an 
independent state, the treaties will no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a newly 
independent region would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to 
the Union and the treaties would, from the day of its independence, not apply anymore on its 
territory … Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European State which 
respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union may apply to 
become a member of the Union. An application of this type requires, if the application is accepted 
by the Council acting unanimously, a negotiation on an agreement between the Applicant State 
and the Member States on the conditions of admission and the adjustments to the treaties which 
such admission entails. This agreement is subject to ratification by all Member States and the 
Applicant State.8 
 
According to Prodi, an independent Scotland would find itself outside of the EU 
and having to apply for membership in the same way as any other third state. Barroso 
repeated, almost verbatim, Prodi’s answer in his letter of December 2012.9 A caveat 
added was that the ‘Commission would express its opinion on the legal consequences 
under EU law upon request from a Member State detailing a precise scenario.’10 The 
Member State government (in this case the UK) has refused to submit such a request, 
as it would, in their view, constitute pre-negotiation on ‘the terms of separation from 
the UK ahead of the referendum.’11 
An exchange of letters between Scotland’s Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
and Commission vice-president Maros Sefcovic offered little of substance. 12 
                                                        
7 Now Article 52 TEU, Article 349 TFEU, and Article 355 TFEU. 
8 Prodi, supra n4. 
9 Barroso, supra n4. 
10 Barroso was responding to an inquiry of the UK Parliament titled The Economic Implications for the 
United Kingdom of Scottish Independence. The claim of commenting in the abstract thus stretched the 
sinews of credibility. 
11 ‘Scottish independence: UK ministers not seeking advice on Scotland in EU’, (1 Nov. 2012) BBC 
News, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-20164826. 
12 See, in sequence: S. Carrell, ‘Scotland calls for urgent talks over EU membership’, (10 Dec. 2012) 
The Guardian, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/dec/10/scotland-urgent-talks-eu-
membership; Letter from Maroš Sefčovič, Vice-president of the European Commission, to Ms Nicola 
Sturgeon MSP (22 Jan. 2013), at http://www.scotreferendum.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/CAB08_0122142752_001.pdf; Letter from Nicola Sturgeon MSP to Maroš 
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Sturgeon’s statement to the Scottish Parliament, delivered as a riposte to Barroso’s 
letter, observed that the Commission ‘is not the final arbiter of these matters’, and 
went on to assert ‘there is absolutely no provision in the EU Treaties for the 
disapplication of those Treaties or the removal of EU citizenship from a country and 
its people when they exercise their democratic right to self-determination.’ 13 
Sturgeon’s rebuttal did rest on some academic support.14 The conversation seems to 
be, for now, over although several EU Member States have signalled support for the 
Commission’s position with others refusing to comment. 15  The Commission’s 
position creates a situation where Scotland would, at least for a period, find itself 
outside of the EU. Such a development would represent a sharp dislocation to the 
EU’s single market, with the rights and status of students, investors, and migrant 
workers (amongst others) being brought into question. 
In addition to the statements of Prodi and Barroso we can look back to the case of 
German unification to find evidence of the Commission’s outlook. The case provides 
arguably the most relevant historical precedent. 16  In one sense it represented the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Sefčovič, Vice-president of the European Commission (23 Jan. 2013), at 
http://www.scotreferendum.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/DFM-Letter.pdf. 
13 N. Sturgeon, ‘Statement on Scotland and the European Union’, (13 Dec. 2012) Scottish Parliament 
Official Report, at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28862.aspx?r=7603. 
14 Most notably by Graham Avery, Honorary Director-General of the Commission, David Edward, a 
former Judge of the ECJ, and Neil MacCormick. See ‘Scottish independence: EU “could not ask Scots 
to leave”’, (31 Oct. 2012) BBC News, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-20155813; D. 
Edward, ‘Scotland and the European Union’, (17 Dec. 2012) Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum, at 
http://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleTyp
e/ArticleView/articleId/852/David-Edward-Scotland-and-the-European-Union.aspx; and N. 
MacCormick, ‘Is There a Constitutional Path to Scottish Independence?’, (2000) 53(4) Parliamentary 
Affairs 721, 733-736. 
15 The Commission’s position has been supported through statements by the foreign ministers of Spain, 
Ireland, Latvia and the Czech Republic. The full range of responses can be found here, ‘Scottish 
Independence: Scotland and EU Membership’, (7 Mar. 2013) BBC News, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21601242. 
16 There is no direct historical precedent to guide the EU in handling Scottish independence. There 
have been three examples of a technical reduction of the Community’s territory: Algeria’s separation 
from France in 1962, which resulted in Algeria’s withdrawal from the EEC; the Antilles separation 
from the Netherlands in 1962, which resulted in the Antilles’ withdrawal from the EEC; and 
Greenland’s withdrawal from the EEC, while remaining part of Denmark albeit it with enhanced 
autonomy, in 1985. While the first two examples should be seen in their post-colonial context and 
therefore not particularly analogous to Scotland, Greenland is an interesting case, having achieved the 
obverse of what Scotland seeks – remaining a part of a Member State while leaving the EEC, as 
opposed to Scotland leaving its Member State but remaining in the EU. In this instance, Greenlandic 
people remain Danish and EU Citizens, supporting the argument made below that it is ultimately down 
to the Member State who is, and is not, a citizen for the purposes of European Union law. It also 
demonstrates that it is entirely possible for EU Citizenship to continue in the absence of the territorial 
application of Community Law. See, Friedl Weiss, ‘Greenland's Withdrawal from the European 
Communities’, (1985) 10 ELR 1973. 
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opposite situation to Scottish independence. German unification saw the territorial 
scope of the EU expand, but without a new Member State joining. Continued 
membership for an independent Scotland would see the territorial scope of the EU 
remain unchanged, but with a new Member State added. Avery has termed the two 
scenarios ‘enlargement without accession’ and ‘accession without enlargement’ 
respectively.17 In the case of German unification the Community adopted a simplified 
negotiating procedure. The Commission explored, with Bonn and Berlin, the required 
changes and the Council and the Parliament quickly approved its proposals. It was an 
example of the Commission acting to safeguard the integration project from a 
potentially troublesome development.18 
The most significant outcome of the handling of German unification was the 
Commission’s seeming acceptance of the moving treaty boundary rule. 19  The 
Commission observed that there was 
 
[n]o inherent reason why the basic rules of succession to treaty rights and obligations should not 
apply to an entity having international personality and having been granted extensive treaty-
making powers such as the Community, insofar as the treaties concerned fall within its recognised 
sphere of influence.20 
 
Such action by the Commission can just as easily be interpreted as an attempt to 
ensure that the sort of dislocations, discussed above, did not arise. It is therefore 
logically consistent that, in order to avoid creating a situation in which millions of EU 
citizens are concentrated in a geographical territory right on the border (but not 
within) the EU’s actual territory, boundaries automatically expand in the case of 
absorption of territory by an existing Member State but do not automatically contract 
in the case of part of the territory of an existing Member State gaining independence. 
                                                        
17  See his submission to the House of Commons (24 Sep 2012), at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/643/m05.htm. 
18 For an overview of the process see C. Timmermans, ‘German Unification and Community Law’, 
(1990) 27 CMLR 437; and J.P. Jacqué, ‘German Unification and the European Community’, (1991) 2 
EJIL 1. 
19  See Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 4/1990, 27ff; and P.J. Kuyper, ‘The 
Community and State Succession in Respect of Treaties’, in D. Curtin and T. Heukels (eds), 
Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Vol. 2 
(Martinius Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), at 623; and generally J.P. Jacqué, ‘L’unification de l’Allemagne 
et la Communauté Européenne’, (1990) 94 RGDIP 997. 
20 European Commission, The Community and German Unification (Brussels, 21 Aug. 1990) COM 
(90) 400 final, Vol. 1, Pt. II., 1.1., fn. 614 at 35.  
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The German unification case might thus be best understood as demonstrating a tacit 
understanding amongst the Member States not to jeopardise a process that had 
significant implications for the integration project.21  
 
B Problems with the Commission’s position 
There are two significant problems with the Commission’s position. First, it is far 
from clear why the Commission feels it is the appropriate institution to resolve the 
issue at hand. The ECJ, as the interpreter of the Treaties, is the institution responsible 
for adjudicating the limits of EU competence as against the Member States.22 Second, 
it is unclear precisely where Prodi and Barroso ground their interpretation. The 
language of Article 49 TEU is clear regarding the accession process but they make a 
leap to this without ever justifying why Scotland would necessarily find itself outside 
of the EU. Far from grounding the response in EU law it seems that the Commission 
has grounded its position in public international law and, more specifically, the law 
concerning state continuance and succession. 
In an interview with BBC Hardtalk, Barroso elaborated on his letter to the House 
of Lords as follows 
 
We are a union of states. So, if there is a new state of course that has to apply for membership and 
to negotiate the conditions with the other Member States … For the European Union purpose, 
from a legal point of view, it is certainly a new state. If a country becomes independent it is a new 
state and it has to negotiate with the European Union.23 
 
This argument, however, completely overlooks the dual nature of EU Treaties. 
The EU Treaties are more than just the articles of association of a ‘Union of States’ – 
a substantial body of the EU’s substantive laws are contained within the Treaties too. 
The Treaties contain provisions that are both territorial and institutional. In this 
respect, the Treaties can be said to possess multiple personalities. Territorially 
applicable provisions, such as those that provide for much of the single market, are 
                                                        
21 See Timmermans supra n17 at 438; and Jacqué supra n17. 
22 Robert Lane argues that the power to decide such an issue lies within the ‘rules of Community law as 
interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice.’ R. Lane, ‘Scotland in Europe: An Independent 
Scotland in the European Community’, in W. Finnie et al (eds), Edinburgh Essays in Public Law 
(1991) 143, at 149. 
23 BBC Hardtalk (10 Dec. 2012), at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q03O5el0i3Q, at 19m25s. 
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different in nature from those that regulate the interaction between sovereign entities. 
Crucially, provisions of the Treaties that are territorial in nature are hardly affected if 
the sovereign entity that governs the relevant territory changes. Insofar as those 
provisions for the governance of the EU are concerned, changes to the number or 
identities of participating parties have a direct and substantive affect on the operation 
of those provisions. While incorporating a new state into the EU necessitates a Treaty 
change, the continued operation of the single market does not. This, in part, explains 
the relative ease with which East Germany was incorporated. An extension of the 
territorial scope of the Treaties has little effect on the institutional rules of the EU.24 
Asked about the status of the rump of the UK (R-UK), Barroso responded that R-
UK would not have to reapply because of ‘the principle of the continuity of the 
state.’25 Such a response rules out the notion of the EU as a union of both states and 
peoples (a matter to which the article returns below) and identifies R-UK as the 
continuing state, with Scotland classified as a successor state. The discourse is 
unmistakably that of public international law. 26  The claim that R-UK would be 
deemed the continuator state of the UK with Scotland a successor state represents the 
most likely scenario under international law. 27  However, given the complex 
relationship between EU law and international law, the question of successor and 
continuator status is perhaps not as relevant to the issue at hand as the Commission 
seems to think. 
In Van Gend en Loos the ECJ established that the EU constituted ‘a new legal 
order of international law,’28 a reminder that the relationship between EU law and 
                                                        
24 There are, obviously, incidental consequences upon institutional rules – such as voting weights in the 
Council or the allocation of MEPs, however these do not require Treaty changes. A sudden population 
surge as a result of immigration or a baby boom would have a similar effect. 
25 Supra n21. Similarly Barroso ruled out any notion that r-UK would have to renegotiate the existing 
terms of its membership. 
26 See J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
27 HM Government, Scotland Analysis: Devolution and the Implications of Scottish Independence’, 
Cm. 8554 (HMSO, 2013) 64-110, at http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scotland-analysis-
devolution-and-the-implications-of-scottish-independence. See also M. Happold, ‘Independence: in our 
out of Europe? An Independent Scotland and the European Union’, (2000) 49 ICLQ 15. It should be 
noted that if one adopts the lens of UK constitutional law, as opposed to public international law, it is 
possible to make very different claims about the nature of the Union forged between England and 
Scotland in 1707, see N. MacCormick, ‘The English Constitution, the British State, and the Scottish 
Anomaly’, (1998) Scottish Affairs 129. 
28 Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. The constitutional nature of the European Coal and 
Steel Community Treaty was established as far back as 1956, see Case 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière 
de Belgique v High Authority [1956] ECR 292 In Costa v ENEL the ECJ reaffirmed this (‘the EEC has 
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international law is not a simple hierarchical one. The notion that international law 
regarding state continuance and succession must govern the way that the EU handles 
the case of an independent Scotland presupposes such a hierarchical dynamic. Yet the 
relationship is far more complex. 29  Whilst the EU is committed to ‘the strict 
observance and the development of international law’ (Article 3(5) TEU) there are 
relatively few examples of the ECJ, in its decisions, reaching for international law. 
Exceptions to this include specific international agreements of which the EU, as a 
legal entity, is a party.30 Yet the EU is not party to any agreement that would direct it 
in its dealings with an independent Scotland. The notion that customary rules of 
international law would, in the absence of a specific agreement, guide the EU in this 
area is also doubtful. While some rules of customary international law have been 
incorporated into EU law, the entire rulebook of customary international law has not 
been. Indeed in the area of state continuance and succession the notion of customary 
rules is itself contestable given that it remains one of the murkiest areas of 
international law.31 
An overarching theme of ECJ jurisprudence for decades has been the desire to 
preserve the EU legal order as something autonomous and a series of opinions and 
decisions has established a track record in this regard.32 Specifically on the issue of 
the relationship between international law and EU law the ECJ controversially 
decided the Kadi case.33 The case asked the ECJ to decide whether a UN Security 
Council Resolution must necessarily hold primacy over EU law. The ECJ ruled that 
                                                                                                                                                              
created its own legal system’) and asserted that ‘the transfer by the States from their domestic legal 
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries 
with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act 
incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail’. See Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] 
ECR 585. 
29 See, generally, M. Koskenniemi (ed), International Law Aspects of the European Union (Kluwer, 
1998).  
30 The ECJ has held that international agreements entered in to by the EU constitute part of EU law 
since 1974. See Case 181/73 R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449. 
31  See, generally, D.P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 1967); H. Beemelmans, ‘State Succession in International Law: Remarks 
on Recent Theory and State Praxis’, (1997) 15 B.U. Int’l L.J. 71. 
32 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 
2011) 339-40. 
33  Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Ali Barakaat International Foundation v Council & 
Commission [2008] ECR I–6351. See G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the 
International Legal Order After Kadi’ (2010) 50 Harv. Int. L. J.  1; J. Kokott and C. Sobotta, ‘The Kadi 
Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – Finding the Balance?’, (2012) 23 EJIL 
1015. 
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such primacy was neither automatic nor necessary, stating that ‘the obligations 
imposed by an international agreement […] cannot have the effect of prejudicing the 
constitutional principles of the EC Treaty.’34  It reveals a willingness to set aside 
international law when to apply such rules would mean cutting against principles of 
EU law. Ultimately the solution to the problem posed to the EU by an independent 
Scotland must first be sought in the Treaties, spirit and general principles of the EU as 
well as the jurisprudence of the ECJ.  
 
 
III  The Claims of an Independent Scotland 
A newly independent Scottish state would be able to make two claims, based upon 
specific articles of the Treaties. The first claim would be an expectation that Member 
States and the Commission would respect the principle of sincere cooperation. The 
second would be a claim to have the right of self-determination and the principle of 
democracy respected. Taken together these claims amount to an expectation that 
negotiations about an independent Scotland’s position in the EU would commence 
following a ‘Yes’ vote. Furthermore, it could be used to make the claim that a formal 
accession process, as set out in Article 49 TEU, would not be necessary and that, 
instead, an amendment to the existing EU Treaties would be made to accommodate a 
Scotland emerging from the existing UK. 
Before considering those claims more closely it is important to note that it is not 
possible for an independent Scotland to automatically become a Member State.35 At 
minimum the existing Treaties would have to be amended to include Scotland as a 
Member State in the relevant articles.36 The simplified revision procedure set out in 
Article 48 TEU would not be applicable in this case. The ordinary revision procedure 
applying would thus mandate that all EU Member States ratify the amendment 
(Article 48(4)) but need not trigger a full Convention (Article 48(3)). 
Article 4(3) TEU establishes that ‘pursuant to the principle of sincere 
cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each 
other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties’, before going on to 
                                                        
34 Ibid, at 285. 
35 The term automatic, in this context, means a process whereby no negotiation or Treaty amendment 
would be required on any level. 
36 At Article 52 TEU and footnote 1 of the preamble of both the TEU and the TFEU.  
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charge Member States with taking ‘any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the 
acts of the institutions of the Union.’ An independent Scotland could thus claim, on 
the basis of the principle of sincere cooperation, a right to negotiation with the EU 
between a ‘Yes’ vote in September 2014 and independence itself. Failure to enter into 
such negotiations would hardly represent sincere cooperation and, what is more, the 
dislocation that would be caused to the single market should part of its existing 
territory suddenly find itself expelled would be significant.37 
The need to avoid such a dislocation represents not merely a pragmatic reason for 
the EU to enter negotiations with Scotland immediately following a ‘Yes’ vote, but 
also a legal reason. Article 4 makes clear that if such negative externalities, as would 
be created by Scottish expulsion, threaten to compromise the attainment of the EU’s 
goals then steps must be taken to avoid them. The task of ensuring that the Single 
Market does not suffer any sudden, sharp dislocation is one that flows from the 
Treaties. To allow the EU to stumble, unprepared, into such a scenario by refusing to 
address the issue of an independent Scotland until Independence Day would be a 
violation of the principle of sincere cooperation, bordering on a dereliction of duty by 
the Commission and the Member States. This is especially the case in light of the 
concluding sentence of Article 4, namely that the ‘Member States shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.’  
Article 50 TEU is also particularly relevant. This article, added in the Lisbon 
Treaty, makes clear that Member States have a right to withdraw from the EU. Prior 
to the Lisbon Treaty this right was not explicitly recognised.38 However, Article 50 
creates a legal requirement that ‘the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement 
with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union.’ What Article 50 rules out is a 
quick, unplanned, and unmanaged withdrawal from the EU. The requirement to 
ensure that a framework is in place for the future relationship between the EU and the 
                                                        
37 Avery asks us to consider the precedent applied to Belgium should Wallonia and Flanders agree to 
the break up of that state. ‘It is inconceivable’, he argues ‘that other EU members would require 11 
million people to leave the EU and then reapply for membership’, supra n15. 
38 See H. Hofmeister, ‘“Should I Stay or Should I Go?” – A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw 
from the EU’, (2010) 16 ELJ 589; R.J. Friel, ‘Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal 
from the EU’, (2004) 53 ICLQ 425; and J. Herbst, ‘Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the 
European Union: Who are the “Masters of the Treaties”’, (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1757. 
 12 
departing state reflects recognition that the EU is more than an international 
organisation or treaty body. It is inherent in the nature of the integration project that 
rights acquired through EU membership are complex and reciprocal, and that sudden 
dislocations threaten to damage the fabric of the project. Acceptance of the 
Commission’s official position is acceptance of the notion that the drafters of the 
Lisbon Treaty intended prior negotiation in the case of a Member State seeking 
withdrawal, but not in the case of part of an existing Member State becoming a new 
independent state. Yet the impact to the European project would be identical: a 
sudden and sharp dislocation. It is possible to identify, within Article 50, a principle 
of no automatic and immediate withdrawal.39 Indeed, writing before the era of Article 
50, MacCormick argued that: 
 
[w]henever the Treaties, as the Constitutional Charter of the EU, have come to be in force in 
respect of a state, extending to every part of its territory, they remain in force for the whole 
territory or territories in question, until such time as any variation of this or derogation from it is 
determined by an Intergovernmental Conference and enshrined in an appropriate treaty.40 
 
To take such a purely territorial view of Treaties betrays their dual nature as both 
the EU’s institutional instrument and as a source of substantive rules. MacCormick’s 
view represents the extreme opposite to that expressed by Barroso. The more likely 
answer lies, as this article argues, in the interstices between them. Nonetheless, 
Article 50 has, therefore, made clearer a principle that could already be identified 
within the EU’s constitutional character. 
In addition to the weight of Articles 4 and 50, which taken together suggest an 
underlying principle opposed to any form of immediate withdrawal or expulsion, an 
independent Scotland could claim that EU Member States respect its right to self-
determination, a right that would have been expressed through a clear and democratic 
process. Article 2 TEU reaffirms the EU’s founding on ‘the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
                                                        
39 Returning, briefly, to the Greenland precedent it is perfectly clear that if Scotland did not vote for 
independence but, let us assume, received significantly more autonomy from the UK government and 
then sought to withdraw from the EU (much as Greenland did while remaining part of the Kingdom of 
Denmark), then ‘the negotiation would be no less arduous than that involved in the case of Greenland’, 
see MacCormick, supra n12, at 734. It is not logically consistent to suggest that negotiation would be 
required in the above scenario, but that in the case of independence expulsion would be automatic. 
40 Ibid. 
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rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.’ The Commission’s 
official position creates a situation in which the only way the people of Scotland can 
exercise their democratic right of self-determination is at the cost of their EU 
membership. This represents a deep contradiction on the level of general principles 
and undermines the broader claims of the EU to be a normative power.41  
Furthermore, Article 6(1) TEU states that the ‘freedoms and principles set out in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union … shall have the same 
legal value as the Treaties.’ The Charter itself, according to its preamble, is ‘based on 
the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of 
its activities by establishing the citizenship of the Union.’ The Commission’s position 
does not take account of individual EU citizens, sticking instead to a state-centric 
perspective. The issue of EU citizenship is considered in the next section. 
Based upon the above it is fair to assert that the Member States of the EU, and the 
Commission, would be obliged to enter into negotiations with Scotland after a ‘Yes’ 
vote and before ‘Independence Day’. Once negotiations commence politics takes 
over, of course, but Article 48(3) contains a mechanism to amend the Treaties so as to 
incorporate Scotland in a way that stops short of the requirement for a full convention 
(and would also avoid the requirement of proceeding with a full accession process, as 
per Article 49 TEU). The Commission’s duty is to do as it did in the case of German 
unification; namely to broker a compromise that ensures the minimal disruption to the 
EU. Its present position represents the opposite of such a duty.  
 
 
IV The Claims of the Citizens of an Independent Scotland 
In addition to the claims made on behalf of an independent Scottish state, there is a set 
of claims that might be advanced on behalf of the citizens of that new state. At 
present, those UK citizens who currently reside in Scotland are also citizens of the 
                                                        
41 The claim, deriving from the political science side of EU studies, is that the EU is a power in the 
world less for what it does but more for what it is and what it represents. From that, it is argued, derives 
the power to establish various norms within the international system, and to attract others to those 
norms so that they might adopt them. Central to the ‘normative power’ of the EU, it is argued, are 
commitments to democracy, self-determination, and the rule of law. See I. Manners, ‘Normative Power 
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms’, (2002) 40(2) JCMS 235; and R. Whitman (ed), Normative Power 
Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). For a critique see A. 
Hyde-Price, ‘“Normative” Power Europe: A Realist Critique’, (2006) 13(2) JEPP 218. 
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EU. Although EU citizenship as a legal concept was only introduced at Maastricht42, 
the notion that the European project encompassed both Member States and their 
nationals long pre-dates 1992.43 The ‘Market Citizen’ has been a familiar term since 
the 1970s.44 Although not citizens, properly so-called, the term was used within the 
Community to describe those Member States’ nationals who availed themselves of 
their rights of free movement within the common market.45 Since the establishment of 
EU citizenship in 1992 a number of rulings by the ECJ have expanded its scope, 
raising significant questions about its relationship to national citizenship.46  Aidan 
O’Neill has suggested that analysis of an independent Scotland’s EU membership 
must take into account EU citizenship and its current possession by those who will 
become Scottish citizens.47 The starting assumption of this section is, therefore, that 
the claims enunciated on behalf of an independent Scottish state failed to persuade 
and were not accepted as sufficient to keep Scotland within the EU on the day of its 
independence. In other words, let us assume that Barroso’s view has to all intents and 
purposes materialised.48  
Two questions then arise. First, what claims might be made on behalf of the 
citizens of an independent Scotland with the aim of avoiding being deprived of their 
status as EU citizens? Second, could any such claims made on behalf of those citizens 
act to generate EU membership for the Scottish state itself? 
This section proceeds as follows. First we consider how the government of R-UK 
might deal with independence in terms of citizenship and nationality issues. Only if 
they deal with it in such a way as to deprive existing EU citizens of that status might 
                                                        
42 Maastricht boldly asserted ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established,’ Article 20 TEU. See C. 
Closa, ‘The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union’, (1992) 29 CMLR 1137; S. 
O’Leary, ‘Nationality Law and Community Citizenship: A Tale of Two Uneasy Bedfellows’, (1992) 
12 YBEL 353. 
43  A. Wiener, ‘Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship’, (1997) European 
Integration Online Papers No. 17. 
44 H.P. Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Oxford University Press, 1972) 147. 
45 See M. Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, in J. Shaw and G. More (eds), New Legal 
Dynamics of European Union (Oxford University Press, 1995) 73. 
46 See D. Kochenov, ‘The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification’, 
(2013) 19 ELJ 502. 
47 A. O’Neill, supra n2; also O’Neill’s evidence submission to Scottish Affairs Select Committee, 
House of Commons at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmscotaf/1608/1608we16.htm. 
48 If the Barroso view did not materialise, and Scotland found itself accepted into the EU without a 
single day spent outside then the issue of claims on behalf of its citizens would be redundant as they 
would each retain their EU citizenship by virtue of Scotland being a Member State on the day of 
independence. 
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claims premised on citizenship be activated. Second we consider the status of EU 
citizenship as set out in the EU Treaties. A plain text reading of those provisions 
could lead to the conclusion that no claims could be made on behalf of the citizens of 
an independent Scotland and that the law regarding EU citizenship can be reconciled 
with the Barroso position of ‘leave upon independence and then apply’. The section 
then goes on to consider EU citizenship as it has developed through the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ, arguing that this significantly complicates matters. We conclude that no 
matter how it is examined, the notion that EU citizenship could be in some way 
generative of EU membership for Scotland is far-fetched. 
 
A UK Nationality Law and the Withdrawal of Citizenship 
UK nationality law is far from straightforward and it is impossible to predict with 
certainty how R-UK might respond to Scottish independence in terms of nationality 
and citizenship law. Thus, following the above, in the event of independence all of 
those residing in Scotland who currently have the status of EU citizen would retain it, 
either by virtue of their (for example) French, German, Spanish (etc.) nationality, or 
by virtue of their retained British citizenship. This would simply be a case of (British) 
territory leaving the (British) citizen as opposed to the (British) citizen leaving 
(British) territory.  
Nationality law in the United Kingdom has a particularly unusual genesis, owing 
to the Britain’s colonial past. In order to fully understand British nationality law and 
its relationship to EU Citizenship, an appreciation of the development of British 
nationality law in the 20th century is necessary. 
The status ‘British subject’ was a product of common law until it was placed on a 
statutory footing by the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914. It existed 
as the sole category of British nationality that applied to persons born in or 
naturalized to the Crown’s dominions. However, following the First World War the 
British Empire’s borders began to contract and, following the passage of the British 
Nationality Act 1948, distinct categories of citizenship began to emerge. 
‘Citizen of the UK and Colonies’ (CUKC) became the primary status for persons 
who were British subjects by virtue of a connection with a place that, at the date of 
commencement, remained within the UK and Colonies. A person who was a citizen 
of an independent Commonwealth country became a ‘Citizen of a Commonwealth 
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country’. A person who was a British subject resident in a place that was formerly UK 
colony but had not acquired citizenship of the independent country that replaced that 
colony became a ‘British subject without citizenship’. Finally, a special category of 
British subject was created for certain citizens of Eire. Following the establishment of 
the Irish Free State, and the subsequent declaration of the Republic, the United 
Kingdom continued to regard Irish citizens as British subjects49. Upon the passage of 
the British Nationality Act 1948, citizenship of Éire was recognized and such citizens 
were not included as Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Irish citizens 
could, by application, claim continuance of their status as a British subject provided 
they met certain, less-than-onerous criteria. Following the passage in Ireland of the 
Republic of Ireland Act 1948, the United Kingdom enacted the Ireland Act 1949. The 
Ireland Act provided that, for the purposes of UK laws, Ireland was not to be regarded 
as a foreign country, and Irish citizens should not be regarded as aliens under any 
law.50 
However, it was not until the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of 
1962 and 1968, and the Immigration Act 1971 that a distinction was drawn between 
those who were patrials (that is, those who were born, adopted, or naturalized in the 
United Kingdom, or had a parent or grandparent who was so born, adopted or 
naturalized) and non-patrials. Patrials became CUKCs with a right to reside in the 
United Kingdom, while non-patrials had no such right. 
When the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community in 1973, 
it was that right to reside in the UK that was the determining factor as to which 
citizens the UK deemed to be nationals for the purposes of Community Law. The 
Final Act of the UK’s accession treaty included a declaration stating that British 
nationals for the purposes of Community Law means 
 
(a) persons who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or British subjects not 
possessing that citizenship or the citizenship of any other Commonwealth country or territory, 
who, in either case, have the right of abode in the United Kingdom, and are therefore exempt 
from United Kingdom immigration control;  
                                                        
49Although not insofar as naturalized Irish citizens were concerned. 
50 s.2(1) British Nationality Act 1948. 
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(b) persons who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies by birth or by registration or 
naturalisation in Gibraltar, or whose father was so born, registered or naturalised.51 
 
Aside from the special provision made for persons connected to Gibraltar, only 
those CUKC citizens with a right to reside in the UK were, therefore, to be considered 
nationals for the purposes of Community Law. 
The British Nationality Act 1981 (currently in force) sought to consolidate the 
preceding decades’ nationality and immigration legislation. It did so by creating no 
fewer than four new categories of British nationality.52 CUKCs with a right to reside 
in the United Kingdom became British Citizens.53 CUKCs without a right to reside in 
the UK became either British Dependent Territories Citizens54 (where the territory 
with which they were associated was still a colony), or British Overseas Citizens55 
(where the territory with which they were associated was no longer a colony). British 
subjects without citizenship and British subjects with Irish citizenship became merely 
British subjects – a status that, crucially, cannot be transmitted to the bearer’s issue. 
In light of these changes to British nationality law, the UK issued a new 
declaration as to which citizens are to be nationals for the purposes of Community 
Law.56 The 1982 declaration provides that the only British citizens, British subjects 
with a right of abode in the UK, and British Dependent Territories associated with 
Gibraltar are to be considered British nationals for the purpose of Community Law. 
Insofar as nationality law is concerned this article proposes that the Irish case is the 
best progenitor to Scottish independence, and that the UK is most likely to address the 
question of citizenship by reference to Ireland. This, however, is subject to a number 
of caveats. 
First, it is safe to assume that Scotland’s secession from the United Kingdom 
would be considerably less acrimonious than Ireland’s. The negotiations that took 
                                                        
51 Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the 
definition of the term 'nationals', Treaty concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, 
the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community [1972] OJ L73/5. 
52 A fifth category, British National (Overseas), was created by the Hong Kong Act 1985. 
53 Supra n48, at s11. 
54 Ibid. s23. This category later became British Overseas Territory Citizens. 
55 Ibid. s26. 
56 Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the 
definition of the term `nationals` [1982] OJ C 23/1. 
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place over the section 30 order57 is evidence of this. Second, it can also be assumed 
that, unlike in Ireland’s case, the issues raised by this article will be settled in 
Scotland’s independence negotiations. Third, Scotland will become a sovereign 
Commonwealth realm, unlike Ireland – which was a Dominion and then an 
independent republic. 
Notwithstanding the above caveats, it is submitted that, on the basis of practice 
relating to Ireland, it is likely that the United Kingdom would seek to withdraw 
British citizenship from citizens of Scotland and confer upon them a secondary, non-
transmittable status.58 It is unlikely that the government of the UK would wish to 
continue to possess any responsibility for an additional 5.3 million ex-pats. It is 
particularly unlikely that the UK government would wish to continue sending Winter 
Fuel Allowance to almost a million Scottish pensioners. This would place Scots in a 
similar position to those Irish citizens who retain their status as British subjects. 
Should Scots be allowed to retain some form of British nationality following 
independence,59 it is likely that such a form of nationality would allow those Scots to 
continue in their status as EU Citizens. If Scots are afforded British subject status 
through an amendment to the 1981 Act then any such subjects as have a right of 
abode in the United Kingdom would continue to be British nationals and, therefore, 
EU citizens in accordance with the 1983 Declaration. 60  The creation of a new 
category of British nationality would require an update to the 1983 Declaration in 
order for such Scots to continue to be regarded as British nationals for the purposes of 
EU Law. 
                                                        
57 The Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013, an order under s.30 of the Scotland 
Act 1998. 
58 Possibly British subject status, or some new category of British nationality. 
59 Although Theresa May has certainly not made this clear and has, in fact, hinted that it may not be the 
case at all: ‘decisions about UK citizenship rest with the United Kingdom Government. However, if 
there is a vote in the referendum for separation, Scotland will become a separate state and not be part of  
the United Kingdom.’ Hansard, 10 Jun 2013: Column 16. 
60 In Case C-192/99 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte: Manjit Kaur [2001] 
ECR I-01237, the ECJ was asked to consider what the effect in Community Law of the 1972 and 1982 
UK declarations, as well as the second declaration to the Treaty of Maastricht. Held, that as the United 
Kingdom’s accession was agreed upon by all contracting states, and that the declaration formed part of 
that final act, ‘the 1972 Declaration must be taken into consideration as an instrument relating to the 
Treaty for the purpose of its interpretation and, more particularly, for determining the scope of the 
Treaty ratione personae.’ The court further held that as the 1982 declaration was merely an update to 
the 1972 declaration in light of the passage of the British Nationality Act 1981, it is the 1982 
declaration that should be referred to in determining who is a national of the United Kingdom for the 
purposes of Community Law. 
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However, this form of continued EU citizenship remains contingent upon being a 
British national. Those Scots who hold EU citizenship may well do so by virtue of a 
virtue of form of British nationality that is not transmittable. In the absence of a 
patrial link to the remainder of the United Kingdom, the first Scot born on 
independence day would not, under these circumstances, be a British national or EU 
citizen. In short, Scots EU citizens would become an endangered species. 
Notwithstanding the finity of such Scots British citizens, any decision by the R-
UK government preserve a form of British nationality, and thus EU citizenship, for all 
those who currently possess it would seem to trigger no claim on behalf of the citizens 
of a new Scotland, except those who did not wish to continue as UK citizens.61 
Alternatively, if the government of R-UK legislated to change British nationality law 
to reclassify existing Scots British citizens in such a way as that they retained some 
form of British subject status short of conferring EU citizenship then claims on behalf 
of far greater a number of Scottish citizens would have to be considered.  
Thus the possibility arises that at least some, if not many, of those who would 
become Scottish citizens and are currently EU citizens will be faced with the loss of 
that latter status either because of decisions taken by the government of R-UK in 
London or because they wish to exercise their choice to be solely Scottish citizens. 
 
B EU Citizenship in the Treaties 
Those familiar with the status of EU citizenship in the Treaties may wonder why this 
is an issue at all. Textbook descriptions have tended to describe EU citizenship as 
‘additional to’ or ‘contingent upon’ citizenship of a Member State.62 Despite being 
boldly established in the Treaty of Maastricht EU citizenship does not afford the 
bearer the protection of a sovereign no matter where they are. Rather, the conception 
of EU citizenship contained within the Treaties is a collection of rights common to all 
citizens of Member States. From an external perspective, EU citizens remain nationals 
                                                        
61 It is a fair assumption that many who may vote for independence out of a fervent sense of Scottish 
nationalism may wish to give up their UK citizenship following independence. They would thus be 
faced with being forced to retain such citizenship simply as a way to access the provisions of EU 
citizenship. 
62 Craig and de Búrca, supra n7, at ch. 23. 
 20 
of their respective Member State. Thus, Article 20 TEU expressly states, ‘citizenship 
of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship’.63 
This article is not concerned with external perspectives on EU citizenship, except 
in consideration of the question: who is, or is not, a citizen of the EU? A plain reading 
of the Treaties (Article 20(1) TFEU) provides what appears to be a relatively 
straightforward answer: ‘[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union.’ Furthermore, the second declaration attached to the 
final act of Maastricht reiterates the principle that questions of nationality are within 
the exclusive domain of states.64 Prima facie this appears to be a definitive answer to 
the question at hand. There seems to be little in a literal reading of the treaties that 
could not be reconciled with the Commission’s official position. Citizens of the EU 
who currently enjoy that status by virtue of being UK citizens may lose that status in 
the event of Scottish independence. The change in their status from UK to Scottish 
citizens would not, according to the state-centric perspective adopted by the 
Commission, have any implications. 
However, though the exclusive domain principle was recognised in Micheletti, 
the ECJ in its judgment wedged the door of judicial competence open just enough to 
facilitate the proliferation of the more inventive jurisprudence that we have seen in 
recent years.65 In Micheletti, the ECJ considered the case of a man who was a dual 
citizen of Argentina and Italy. Mr Micheletti moved to Spain from Argentina, and 
applied for a residents permit as a citizen of a Member State (Italy). In Spanish 
nationality law, where a person is a dual national and neither of those nationalities is 
Spanish, nationality corresponding to the habitual residence of the person concerned 
before their arrival in Spain is to take precedence. In Mr Micheletti’s case, this was 
Argentina. He contended that he was a Member State national and therefore entitled 
to residence in Spain. The court held that ‘[u]nder international law, it is for each 
Member State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions for 
                                                        
63 This sentence was not included in the TEC at Maastricht, but was subsequently inserted by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. The authors speculate that this was done with the intention of reiterating the 
sovereignty of Member States over matters of citizenship. 
64 Declaration 2, Treaty on European Union Final Act (Maastricht, 7 February 1992), ‘the question 
whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference 
to the national law of the Member State concerned. Member States may declare, for information, who 
are to be considered their nationals for Community purposes by way of a declaration lodged with the 
Presidency and may amend any such declaration when necessary’. 
65 Case C-369/90 Micheletti v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-04239. 
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the acquisition and loss of nationality.’66 The Court went on to find that it was not 
lawful for Spain to abrogate Mr Micheletti’s rights under the Treaty as a Member 
State national by imposing an additional condition upon its recognition. We see here, 
once again, the interaction between international law and EU law and the need to take 
the latter into account always when considering questions that at first glance appear to 
be governed by the former. Member States, in deciding who is and who is not a 
citizen of that state, must have due regard for Community law and thus it is necessary 
to consider those rules of Community law to which domestic law must have due 
regard.  
 
C EU Citizenship in the Jurisprudence of the ECJ 
Recent jurisprudence of the ECJ has brought into question the derivative nature of EU 
citizenship. It is clear from decisions in cases such as Grzelczyk, Rottmann, and 
Zambrano, that the Court no longer regards EU citizenship as being subordinate to 
Member State citizenship. If anything, the Court takes quite the opposite view. The 
question that must be asked is, therefore, in the event of Scotland becoming an 
independent state can its citizens make a claim to continue as EU citizens irrespective 
of the treatment afforded to them by the government of R-UK? 
The decision in Grzelczyk is important in this regard, albeit more for its rhetoric 
than its substance.67 The case concerned a Community national who was a student in 
a Member State other than that of which he was a national. The question before the 
Court was whether the rights contained in Articles 18, 20, and 21 of the TEU (ex. 
Articles 6, 8, and 8a TEC) precluded a Member State from discriminating against 
nationals from other Member States, where such nationals are not ‘workers’ under 
Article 45 TFEU. The ECJ, uncontrovertibly, found that such discrimination was 
contrary to the Treaty provisions. 68  However, it was through the ECJ’s 
pronouncement that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States’ that Grzelczyk opened the door for consideration of 
the nature of EU citizenship. 
                                                        
66 Ibid, at para. 10, emphasis added. 
67 C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
I-6193. 
68 Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I 2691. 
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In subsequent cases the ECJ has artfully avoided addressing the inherent 
linguistic contradiction in a status that is ‘additional to’ (in the treaty) and also 
‘fundamental’ (in their jurisprudence). The decision in Rottmann concerned the case 
of a man who, in many respects, found himself in a situation similar to that which 
Scots might find themselves, facing the loss of his citizenship of a Member State, and 
therefore his EU citizenship. 69  Mr Rottmann, an Austrian national, moved to 
Germany for the purpose of acquiring German nationality. He acquired it in 1999, 
whereupon he was deemed under Austrian law to have renounced his Austrian 
nationality. Having concealed from German authorities the fact that he was under 
investigation for a number of crimes in Austria, the German authorities withdrew his 
naturalisation. Subject to the judicial process, as there was no mechanism for Mr 
Rottmann to automatically recover his Austrian nationality and, should the 
withdrawal be completed, would have the effect of rendering him stateless.70 Relying 
on the ECJ’s obiter dictum in Grzelczyk, the Court held, 
 
‘[in] the situation of a citizen of the Union who … is faced with a decision withdrawing his 
naturalisation, adopted by the authorities of one Member State, and placing him … in a position 
capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 17 EC and the rights attaching 
thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union 
law’.71 
 
By placing the matter within the competence of EU law, the ECJ proceeded to 
review the decision of the German authorities by reference to a proportionality test 
(discussed below). While the decision in Rottmann pertains to a highly unusual set of 
circumstances, the intended effect of the decision is clear: the reversal in the order of 
supremacy with respect to nationality and citizenship. In doing so, the ECJ implicitly 
re-wrote the treaties, making citizenship of Member States secondary to EU 
citizenship. 
                                                        
69 Case C-315/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-01449. 
70 This article does not consider issues surrounding statelessness, as it is an issue that is highly unlikely 
to arise in Scotland’s case. Nonetheless, there exists in International Law a general obligation upon 
states to avoid rendering persons stateless – see Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
(adopted 28 September 1954, entered into force 6 June 1960) 360 UNTS 117 and Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (adopted 30 August 1961, entered into force 13 December 1975) 989 UNTS 
175. 
71 Ibid. para. 42, emphasis added. 
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The Rottmann case gave the ECJ the opportunity to give material effect to its 
stated intentions in Grzelcyzk.72 The difficulty in Scotland’s case is that the view 
taken by the ECJ does not appear to be shared by Member States or the European 
Commission. Every government that submitted an observation to the ECJ, as well as 
the Commission, expressed the opinion that rules as to acquisition and loss of 
Member State nationality fall within the competence of that state.73 Such uniformity 
was repeated by the observations of all governments, and the Commission in 
Zambrano.74 Given that, as d’Oliveira points out, the second declaration appended to 
the Maastricht Treaty leaves nothing to the imagination75, the observations submitted 
to the ECJ merely confirm that the Member States’ collective position on matters of 
nationality is unchanged. 
It appears, therefore, that the ECJ does not consider EU citizenship as being 
dependent upon Member State nationality. Certainly, there is little doubt that the ECJ 
has been prepared to act in ways that prevent Member States acting in such a way so 
as to deny the possible enjoyment of EU citizenship rights. The ECJ’s recasting of EU 
citizenship as a ‘fundamental status’ of EU nationals is a brazen example of judicial 
activism. The issue can be dichotomised as the distinction between an individualist 
conception of citizenship and an indexical conception. The former sees individuals as 
the custodians of rights. The latter sees rights as belonging to a class or group, rather 
than an individual. The individualist conception provides, perhaps, the strongest 
argument for the continuance of EU citizenship post-independence as citizenship 
rights adhere to all citizens as individuals, rather than to the group to which they 
belong. This could be said to be an inelastic model of citizenship. The indexical 
conception sees citizens as a collective singular, rather than a plurality of individuals. 
The enjoyment of rights adherent to citizenship is dependent upon belonging to the 
class of persons to whom citizenship applies. This could be said to be an elastic model 
of citizenship. It is unclear from the treaties which model of citizenship was 
envisaged. Article 20 TFEU defines EU citizens by reference to an indefinite class, 
                                                        
72  Davies argues that the decision was hardly surprising: ‘[o]ne might find the Court’s approach 
unconvincing were it not so familiar.’ See G.T. Davies, ‘The Entirely Conventional Supremacy of 
Union Citizenship and Rights’ in J. Shaw (ed.), Has the European Court of Justice Challenged 
Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law, EUI Working Paper (RSCAS 2011). 
73 Supra n66, para. 37. 
74 Case C–34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-01177. 
75 H.U.J. d’Oliveria, ‘Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern,’ (2011) 7 ECLR, 128 (note 1). 
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suggesting an indexical citizenship. However, the ECJ – in Grzelcyzk, Rottmann, and 
Zambrano (in particular) – could be said to conceive of EU citizenship as a first-order 
right. The question thus remains: can a status that is ‘fundamental’ really be 
dependent upon nationality of a Member State? 
This raises the question of whether decisions by the government of R-UK 
concerning citizenship would be deemed a purely internal situation. The ‘purely 
internal situation’ rule is a long-standing principle of Community law and was, until 
recently, a relatively straightforward one.76 The purely internal rule in Saunders has 
been confirmed by a string cases, even after the decision in Grzelcyzk.77 The result of 
this rule is that a EU citizen resident in a state other than that of which they are a 
national enjoys the protection of EU law, while a citizen who is resident in their home 
state does not. However, by subjecting the withdrawal of citizenship, from a German 
national resident in Germany, to a proportionality test in Rottmann, the Court appears 
willing to dis-apply the purely internal situation rule under certain circumstances 
where citizenship is concerned. 
The Court, again, dis-applied the purely internal rule in Zambrano.78 The case 
concerned a Columbian national, resident in Belgium, whose young children held 
Belgian citizenship. The Court was asked to consider whether deporting Mr 
Zambrano would be a breach of the rights of his children, as EU nationals, under 
Article 20 TFEU. In interpreting Rottmann, the Court appeared to sweep away the 
purely internal rule entirely, holding that ‘[a]rticle 20 TFEU precludes national 
measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens 
of the Union.’ 79  Zambrano appeared to throw wide open the door to judicial 
consideration of matters of nationality and citizenship in purely internal situations. 
However, less than a month later, and despite a seemingly similar set of 
                                                        
76  ‘The provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers cannot … be applied to 
situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words, where there is no factor 
connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by Community law.’ C-175/78 R v. Saunders 
[1979] ECR 1129, para 11. 
77 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613; ECJ 12 July 2005, Case C-403/03 Schempp v 
Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-06421; Case C-127/08, Metock [2008] ECR I-6241. 
78 Supra n74. 
79 Ibid. para. 42. 
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circumstances, the Court denied the appellant the benefits of Directive 2004/38 in 
McCarthy, and held that the purely internal rule still applied.80 
It is difficult, on the basis of foregoing, to divine the circumstances under which 
the Court will apply the purely internal situation rule, and those in which the rule will 
be disregarded. It can certainly be said that the Court appears to have engaged in a 
degree of cherry picking.81 However, in distinguishing McCarthy from Zambrano it 
appears that ‘the threshold to conclude that a measure deprives a Union citizen of the 
genuine enjoyment of his citizenship rights is rather high.’82 It appears necessary, 
therefore, to draw a distinction between a partial alienation of EU citizenship rights – 
such as in Zambrano and McCarthy – and a wholesale withdrawal of EU citizenship. 
Turning to Scotland, it has to be asked whether depriving Scots of their UK, and 
thus their EU, citizenship in the event of Scottish independence could be considered a 
purely internal situation? It is difficult to argue on the basis of Rottmann that such a 
matter is purely internal, notwithstanding McCarthy. If withdrawing UK citizenship 
from Scots could cause Scots to lose their Union citizenship then that withdrawal, ‘by 
reason of its nature and its consequences,’83 would surely be subject to review under 
Community law.  
Having crossed the threshold for judicial review, under Rottmann, the Court must 
then consider the validity of any decision to withdraw citizenship from Scots subject 
to a standard of proportionality. Unhelpfully there is nothing in Rottmann that informs 
us as to what constitutes proportionate or not. The earlier case of Baumbast concerned 
restrictions placed upon the residence rights of workers under the Treaties.84 Directive 
90/364 provides that Member States can place restrictions on the right of residence in 
order to prevent individuals who exercise that right from becoming an undue burden 
on the host state. The Court held that 
 
[t]hose limitations and conditions must be applied in compliance with the limits imposed by 
Community law and in accordance with the general principles of that law, in particular the 
                                                        
80 P. Van Elsuwege, ‘Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,’ (2011) 7 
ECLR 308. 
81 K. Hailbronner and D. Thym, ‘Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEm),’ 
(2011) 48 CMLR 1253; and N. Nic Shuibhne ‘Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,’ (2012) 49 CMLR 349. 
82 Supra n65 at 314. 
83 Supra n63. 
84 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091. 
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principle of proportionality. That means that national measures adopted on that subject must be 
necessary and appropriate to attain the objective pursued.85 
 
In Baumbast, the objective of the national measures was to prevent EU citizens 
from becoming an undue burden on Member States, and as Mr Baumbast did not pose 
such a burden upon the UK, the effect of the measure was therefore held to be 
disproportionate.  
The objective of citizenship is to create a determinate class of persons who owe a 
duty of loyalty to the state. 86  The UK, in common with other states, requires 
candidates for naturalisation to swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown. 87  As 
discussed above, it is certainly entirely conventional for a state to withdraw 
citizenship from persons associated with seceding territories. As the borders of the 
British Empire contracted, so too did the class of persons whom the UK considered to 
be citizens. Furthermore, it could be considered disproportionate to expect the UK to 
continue the citizenship of over 5 million expatriate citizens residing north of its 
territorial border. It is submitted that, where a class of individuals vote to secede from 
a state, withdrawing citizenship from that class is a proportionate course of action on 
the part of that state. It is therefore further submitted that, notwithstanding the 
question as to whether or not the Scottish case constitutes a purely internal situation, 
the withdrawal of citizenship from Scots nationals would nonetheless satisfy the 
proportionality standard required by the Court in Rottmann. 
Finally, in light of the decision in Zambrano, it is necessary to consider whether 
or not ‘depriving Union citizens of genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of their 
citizenship rights precludes a Member State from wholesale withdrawal of that 
citizenship. It is necessary, in this regard, to draw a distinction between the decision 
in Rottmann, and the decisions in Zambrano, McCarthy, and Dereci. While the latter 
concerned the substance of EU citizenship rights, the former concerns the stativity of 
                                                        
85 Ibid. Applying the proportionality test in Joined cases C-259/91, C-331/91 and C-332/91, Pilar Allué 
and Carmel Mary Coonan and others v Università degli studi di Venezia and Università degli studi di 
Parma [1993] ECR I-04309. 
86 ‘By a “citizen” is commonly meant member of a state, the word “citizenship” being employed to 
designate the status of being a citizen. “Allegiance,” as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie 
which binds the citizen to his state – the obligation  of  obedience and support which he owes to  it. The 
state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its substance is the aggregate of persons 
owing this allegiance.’ See W.W. Willoughby, ‘Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and 
International Law,’ (1907) 4 American Journal of International Law 915. 
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citizenship, or the right to have rights.88 Should the withdrawal of citizenship from 
Scots nationals satisfy the proportionality Rottmann standard, the only question that 
remains is whether or not the wholesale revocation of the primary right (to be an EU 
citizen) can be regarded as an alienation of the rights derived therefrom? 
Whether or not the Court would distinguish between the first-order right of 
citizenship (the right to have rights) and the second-order rights deriving therefrom 
(the substance of the rights conferred) is difficult to predict. Certainly, such a 
distinction would be the most logical way to square the intended meaning of Article 
20 TEU with the decision in Zambrano. This formulation would also be entirely 
consistent with the wording of Grzelcyzk, which is to say that the second-order rights 
derived from EU citizenship attach to ‘nationals of the Member States.’89 
The alternative would, arguably, be the Court’s boldest leap yet in the realm of 
citizenship. Extending the rationale of Zambrano with respect to second-order 
citizenship rights to the first-order right of citizenship would have the effect of 
substantially depriving Member States of their sovereignty over questions of 
citizenship and nationality – by creating an effective prohibition on withdrawal of 
nationality by Member States. It is submitted, therefore, that where questions 
pertaining to the first-order right to be a citizen is concerned it is Rottmann, and not 
Zambrano, to which we must look for answers. 
The article will not speculate as to the outcome of an action brought by a Scottish 
national facing some variation of withdrawal of their citizenship rights. The multiple 
variables the court would be forced to consider creates dozens of potential rationes 
decidendi. It is submitted that however such a case is rationalized, the effective result 
of such a decision must fall into one of four possible outcomes. First, that withdrawal 
of Union citizenship from Scots citizens is proportionate, and that while it is not 
lawful to deprive Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their 
rights, the question as to whether or not they are citizens at all remains a matter for 
Member States. Second, that the UK is not permitted to withdraw British nationality 
from Scots as it would deprive Scots of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
their EU citizenship rights. Third, that who is or is not a UK national remains a matter 
                                                        
88 See R. Bellamy, ‘The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship Practice and the Political Constitution of the 
EU,’ in R. Bellamy and A. Warleigh (eds), Citizenship and Governance in the European Union 
(Continuum, 2001) at 41; and Kochenov, supra n44. 
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for the UK, however as Union citizenship is the fundamental status of Scots citizens, 
those citizens who were Union citizens at the point of independence continue to be 
so,90 notwithstanding their no longer being citizens of a Member State – effectively 
separating EU citizenship from Member State citizenship. Fourth, those citizens of a 
state to emerge from a Member State are Union citizens notwithstanding that state not 
being a member of the EU.91 
Only the fourth outcome creates any type of compelling claim for EU citizenship 
to be generative of EU membership for the state in question. The other potential 
outcomes are premised on the assumption that decisions on citizenship and nationality 
rightly reside within the exclusive domain of the state, and that the ECJ may be 
willing to entertain an exception only in order to ensure that those currently in 
possession of EU citizenship were not deprived on it (outcomes 2 and 3). Under 
outcomes 2 and 3 Scotland would simply be a state that happened to have a very large 
number of EU citizens living in it.  
 
 
V  Conclusion 
This article has considered the case of Scottish independence in the context of the EU. 
Specifically it has taken issue with the Commission’s position, arguing that it rests on 
incorrect ground and contradicts the general principles and spirit of the Treaties. An 
independent Scotland would be able to advance a series of claims based on the 
principles of sincere cooperation, good faith, and respect for democracy, claims which 
taken together ought to result in as smooth a transition as possible – without a formal 
accession process – from Scotland as a part of an existing Member State to Scotland 
as an independent Member State. The article did not argue that negotiation would be 
unnecessary, or that Treaty change would not be required, but has argued that the 
Commission’s duty is to facilitate and broker a smooth transition that avoids any 
dislocation to, or compromising of, the single market. 
In the event that, for whatever reason, Scotland found itself outside of the EU for 
some period of time then there is another element to consider, the claims of the 
                                                        
90 Union citizenship for Scots crystallises upon independence – and while those citizens on that date 
would retain their Union citizenship, their successors would not. 
91 Both the third and fourth outcomes are at the extreme end of judicial inventiveness and should 
therefore be considered most unlikely. 
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citizens of an independent Scotland. The article argued that the ECJ could act in such 
a way as to ensure that all Scots who were EU citizens at the moment of 
independence retained that status until either their death or the accession of Scotland 
to the EU (at which point their EU citizenship would be secured as a derivative of 
their citizenship of a Member State). It could do so either by creating a type of EU 
citizen who did not hold nationality of a Member State, or it could do so by 
instructing the government of R-UK to extend to Scots a form of British nationality 
that made them EU citizens under the terms of the 1983 Declaration. The former route 
would create a clear contradiction with the text of the EU Treaties. The latter route 
would represent significant interference with R-UK’s sovereignty in the area of 
citizenship and nationality. It would be, even by the ECJ’s record, a massive judicial 
leap to extend EU citizenship rights to Scots in a way that was transmissible. But such 
a decision seems to be the most likely way in which citizenship for Scots might be 
somehow generative of EU membership for Scotland. We thus conclude that resting 
any claim of Scotland’s continuing membership of the EU on the base of EU 
citizenship is far-fetched.  
In the final analysis the situation is illustrative of the complex web of rights and 
obligations that an entity such as the EU creates and involves. Far more than an 
international institution/organisation, yet far less than a federal entity, the EU will 
always struggle with such issues that fall in these tricky in-between areas. Indeed, 
pragmatism, good faith, and sincere cooperation seem to represent the best hope that 
an independent Scotland would continue seamlessly within the EU. The question 
tackled in this article has to be judged on weights of argument. There is no black-and-
white answer to this question, despite the stance of the current Commission president. 
 
